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SHRINKING THE POST-PLENARY POWER PROBLEM 
Michael Kagan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Matthew J. Lindsay’s excellent article Disaggregating 
“Immigration Law” arrives at a pivotal moment in the evolution of 
American immigration law.1 My understanding of this moment is thus: 
A majority of Supreme Court justices appear to be at least occasionally 
uneasy with the plenary power doctrine that has shaped immigration law 
since the Chinese Exclusion Case,2 but they are not all sure how to live 
without it either.3 So long as this remains the case, the Court’s 
immigration jurisprudence is likely to be incrementally favorable to 
immigrants on the whole, but tentative, inconsistent, and incoherent in 
some important ways. In my view, the importance of Professor 
Lindsay’s intervention is that it helps point a way to find clarity in this 
transitional period.  
Since the 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,4 the Supreme Court 
has appeared increasingly willing to defend immigrants’ due process 
rights vis-à-vis federal immigration authorities. The Court’s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky5 undermines the formalistic distinction between 
criminal punishments and supposedly civil immigration enforcement, a 
distinction that had long been invoked to prevent immigrants from 
claiming more procedural rights when they face deportation. In addition 
to these two landmark cases, the Court has issued a series of decisions 
strengthening the categorical approach to interpreting criminal grounds 
of removal, in effect limiting the executive branch’s power to broadly 
construe deportation powers.6 Finally, the Court has invoked federalism 
to block some state-level anti-immigrant legislation.7 
But there are other winds blowing. A majority of the justices recently 
refused to apply meaningful scrutiny to the denial of a spousal visa 
based on opaque security grounds, even though the denial threatened a 
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 1. Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
 3. See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22–23, 26–27 (2015). 
 4. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  
 5. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 6. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990–91 (2015); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690, 1692, 1693–94 (2013). 
 7. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012). 
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U.S. citizen’s family unity.8 But the justices could not agree on a single 
rationale to explain that decision.9 Most recently, the depleted Court 
divided 4-4 about the propriety of President Barack Obama’s deferred 
action programs.10 These decisions are strong indications that the 
justices remain divided and perhaps a bit unsure about some central 
issues in immigration law.11  
Even if I am right that many justices have doubts about plenary 
power, the sheer vastness of immigration law is a challenge for any 
judicial project aimed at getting rid of it. Some immigration cases 
involve substantive legal grounds for deporting people from the United 
States.12 Some involve due process rights of people who are detained 
before deportation.13 Some involve eligibility for asylum.14 Some 
involve requests for visas for family members abroad.15 Some involve 
companies in the United States that want to import specialized 
workers.16 Some involve questions about the limits of Presidential 
power to shape immigration policy.17 Some involve questions about the 
limits of state power to shape immigration policy.18 And that’s just a 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
 9. See id. at 2138–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 10. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th 
Cir. 2015). 
 11. In the 2016-2017 term, the Court will hear more cases that will provide another 
reading on the current status of plenary power—potentially including the question of whether 
plenary power remains relevant at all. For example, Jennings v. Rodriguez involves an extension 
of due process to people detained for more than six months while their immigration cases are 
pending. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 2489 (2016); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jennings-v-rodriguez/?wpmp_switcher=desktop 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016). Lynch v. Morales-Santana revisits the question of whether 
Congress may treat mothers and fathers differently in the conferral of citizenship to foreign-born 
children. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 523–24 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016); see also Lynch v. Morales-Santana, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lynch-v-morales-santana/?wpmp_switcher=desktop 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 12. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–84 (2013) (holding that 
conviction under a state statute that was punishable as a misdemeanor in certain circumstances 
was not equivalent to a federal felony for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act); 
Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 3689050 
(2016).  
 13. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriquez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting writ of certiorari). 
 14. See, e.g., INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449–50 (1987). 
 15. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2196–97 (2014). 
 16. See, e.g., Fogo de Chao v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d 
134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 18. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012); Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011). 
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partial list. The plenary power doctrine, broadly understood, has caused 
many problems. But it has the virtue of being a broad theory capable of 
guiding the resolution of all of these cases, even if it resolves them in 
problematic ways. Developing a replacement theory that can do similar 
work is daunting, which may make justices hesitant to entirely discard 
the devil we know, so to speak. 
II.  THE APPEAL OF DISAGGREGATION 
 Professor Lindsay argues that there were originally many 
splintered laws, mostly at the state level, that impacted non-citizens.19 
These laws became federalized and to some extent unified under the 
rubric of plenary power, creating what we think of as immigration law.20 
But the justifications for a broad plenary power doctrine have long been 
questionable. In particular, Professor Lindsay highlights the fact that 
federal authority over foreign affairs and national security is not a 
helpful guidepost for many of the specific, practical questions that arise 
in daily practice of this thing we call immigration.21 In a narrow sense, 
these insights are not entirely new. For instance, other scholars have 
observed that the Supreme Court has probably overstated the foreign 
affairs dimension of immigration policy.22 But as I see it, the importance 
of Professor Lindsay’s intervention is not in questioning the reach of the 
foreign affairs rationale. It is that he takes the next logical step by 
questioning whether immigration law should have a single coherent 
rationale in the first place. While Professor Lindsay focuses on foreign 
affairs, this logic is farther reaching because it suggests that only by 
disaggregating immigration can we correctly account for the importance 
of foreign affairs, national security, civil liberties, economic policy, and 
the many other policy interests that play a role in regulating non-
citizens. In this sense, Professor Lindsay’s most important argument is 
really right in the title: “Immigration Law” is in quotes. 
 Another way to think of this would be to say that many different 
bodies of law impact non-citizens in particular ways. These disparate 
bodies of law together are known as “immigration law,” but perhaps the 
only thing they really share is that they all affect non-citizens. It may be 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Lindsay, supra note 1, at 22.  
 20. See id. at 32.  
 21. See id. at 41.  
 22. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens and the 
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1594 (1997) (arguing that a shift to foreign affairs 
rationales supported a nationalization of immigration law, but that the importance of foreign 
affairs can be overstated); Peter J. Spiro, Rebuttal, State Action on Immigration (Bad and Good) 
After Arizona v. United States, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 107 (2012) (questioning the 
Supreme Court’s invocation of a broad foreign affairs power to justify preemption of state 
immigration measures). 
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a mistake to assume that they are one coherent legal system in the 
manner of torts law or criminal procedure. We understand that a 
decision in a traffic accident case might refine the concept of 
negligence, and thus impact a workplace injury case. We understand that 
a search and seizure decision in drug trafficking prosecution could later 
have ramifications in a larceny case. But we should not assume that a 
decision imposing constitutional limitations on detention of non-citizens 
in the United States necessarily changes the law about whether a person 
on the other side of the world can obtain a spousal visa to come here. 
We should thus not be surprised that the justices in the majority in Kerry 
v. Din23 failed to even cite Zadvydas v. Davis.24 These cases both deal 
with non-citizens, but they deal with non-citizens who are in very 
different situations, implicating very different interests, rights, and 
constitutional concerns. In this way, immigration law should be 
disaggregated. 
It seems to me that a strong piece of evidence in favor of 
disaggregation is the way Congress has fragmented the regulation of 
immigration across many different federal agencies. Immigration law 
casebooks include elaborate organizational charts attempting to depict 
the ways in which different aspects of this body (or bodies) of law are 
administered by USCIS, ICE, CBP, the Department of Justice (EOIR), 
the Department of Labor, and the Department of State, among others.25 
Perhaps what we really have is a Law of Citizenship, a Law of Entry 
and Admission, a Law of Removal, a Law of Family Unity, a Law of 
Foreign Labor Regulation, and so on. There are probably many potential 
ways to disaggregate immigration and I will not attempt to develop a 
precise taxonomy here. The point is simply that by breaking 
immigration into narrower bodies of law, each focused on a unique 
context and set of concerns, the difficult legal problems should become 
easier to manage. 
III.  THE EXCEPTIONALISM TEMPTATION 
A counterpoint to Professor Lindsay’s thesis may be found in a 
similarly important study by Professors David S. Rubenstein and 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram.26 Their article starts from a premise that is 
common to most critiques of plenary power: that immigration has often 
been treated differently for constitutional purposes than other areas of 
                                                                                                                 
 23. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).  
 24. See generally id. But see id. at 2144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Zadvydas in 
support of procedural due process). 
 25. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 5 (5th ed. 2009). 
 26. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730956. 
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law.27 But they rebuke immigration scholars for sometimes opposing 
exceptionalism and sometimes invoking it so as to achieve particular 
results.28 Thus, scholars who want to discard plenary power with regard 
to immigrants’ civil liberties are all too willing to invoke it if it helps 
strike down Arizona’s anti-immigrant legislation at the state level, or 
defend President Obama’s deferred action programs.29 Professors 
Rubenstein and Gulasekaram argue that for constitutional purposes, the 
civil liberties, federalism, and separation of powers problems of 
immigration law cannot be neatly partitioned from each other.30 They 
argue that immigration law poses a constitutional “trilemma” because it 
requires accounting for each of these different problems through a 
holistic approach.31 Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram thus argue 
that disaggregation is not easily accomplished, and not necessarily 
wise.32 
A signal of this lurking danger can be seen in the frequent citation of 
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC)33 in 
support of President Obama’s use of deferred action.34 AADC contains 
strong endorsement of prosecutorial discretion, which is why it is a 
convenient authority for backers of expanded deferred action.35 But as I 
have explored in more detail elsewhere, AADC is an awful decision 
from the standpoint of immigrants’ civil liberties.36 It seems to endorse 
executive discretion in immigration enforcement to such an extreme 
extent that it would permit infringement of First Amendment liberties 
(although there are ways to read the decision more narrowly).37  
The solution, it seems to me, is to reconcile these two theses, which 
on the surface appear to be in conflict. It is important that Professors 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See id. at 1. 
 28. See id. at 4–5, 24.  
 29. See id. at 28, 31.  
 30. See id. at 42–44, 51–53. Professor Lindsay appears to acknowledge that 
disaggregation of immigration law, especially narrowing the foreign affairs justification, may 
complicate preemption arguments against state immigration measures. See Lindsay, supra note 
1, at n.258. 
 31. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 42–43. 
 32. See id. at 53. 
 33. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 34. See, e.g., Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, 
UCLA School of Law, et al., to President Barack Obama, 1 n.2, (May 28, 2012), 
https://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief28May2012with
Signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3EE-YGNW] (quoting AADC). 
 35. AADC, 525 U.S. at 483–84 (“[T]he INS may decline to institute proceedings, 
terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. . . . A case may be 
selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process.”). 
 36. See Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen 
Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1266–69, 1278–83 (2016). 
 37. See id. at 1266–69. 
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Rubenstein and Gulasekaram do not oppose immigration 
exceptionalism per se. Rather, if I may try to paraphrase, they critique 
exceptionalism of convenience. They warn against taking a particular 
position in a specific immigration case without accounting for the 
unintended doctrinal impact in other immigration cases. As I see it, the 
problem is that this is easier said than done. “Immigration law,” as 
conventionally conceived, is so vast that it may be difficult for lawyers 
and judges to successfully account for all of the potential doctrinal 
implications of moving one way or another in a particular case. The 
daunting nature of this problem can lead the Court in two unsatisfactory 
directions. The Court can fall back on the old, well-established but 
deeply problematic plenary power doctrine.38 Or the Court can issue 
decisions that appear to deviate from established norms without 
explaining clearly if the Court really means to do so. This latter 
approach causes considerable confusion for practitioners and lower 
courts, but for the Supreme Court it has the virtue of maximizing 
flexibility and minimizing unintended consequences.39 
By pushing immigration law toward disaggregation, I believe 
Professor Lindsay makes this problem considerably less daunting 
because it suggests a manageable way to address the doctrinal spillovers 
that Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram warn of. The key is to find 
principled means by which to determine which immigration cases are 
inexorably linked and which maybe severed from each other 
doctrinally. The way to do this, it seems to me, is to be clear that 
disaggregation makes sense in terms of subject matter. A case 
concerning the interpretation of a statutory provision on family 
sponsorship is a different subject than a constitutional challenge to long-
term pre-removal detention of immigrants. One case need not 
necessarily affect the other, which liberates justices to decide the cases 
in front of them without undue concern about unforeseen problems. 
This is the strength of Professor Lindsay’s argument and it is 
convincing so long as the cases really deal with different subjects.  
The critique posed by Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram is at 
its most convincing when immigration cases involve a similar subject. 
We see this if we look at the cases of Zadvydas v. Davis,40 Arizona v. 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 1239–41 
(2015), can be seen as an example of this problematic approach. 
 39. An example of this phenomenon may be seen in the Court’s recent failure—without 
explanation—to invoke Chevron deference in cases concerning criminal grounds of removal, a 
failure that has been explained by the fact formally abandoning Chevron is a hard doctrinal 
choice that not all justices may be yet ready to make. See Asher Steinberg, Torres v. Lynch—A 
Sub Silento Holding on Chevron Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Criminal Law?, 
THE NARROWEST GROUNDS, (June 1, 2016, 12:18 AM), 
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/torres-v-lynch-sub-silentio-holding-on.html. 
 40. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  
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United States41 and United States v. Texas,42 three cases which embody 
the “trilemma” that Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram identify.43 
In a narrow sense, each of these cases asks a different question. One is 
about due process, one is about pre-emption doctrine, and one is about 
executive power. But all three of these cases concern immigration 
enforcement inside the United States. They share a common subject 
matter. Thus, doctrinal changes in one are likely to impact the others. 
Disaggregation among these cases is tempting for advocates who want 
to reach particular results. But there is a much greater risk of rendering 
the doctrine incoherent, or of producing unforeseen and undesirable 
results. 
IV.  SEARCHING FOR NEW ANALOGIES 
In theory, the erosion of plenary power should lead to a 
corresponding erosion of immigration exceptionalism. The trouble is 
that if immigration is not unique, then it must be similar to something 
else. The decline of plenary power demands new analogies. If the goal 
is to normalize immigration law, an apparently useful set of tools 
appears to be offered by administrative law. Immigration law is usually 
seen as a species of administrative law.44 It is comprised of a set of 
complicated, often ambiguous statutes that are interpreted and applied 
by a set of executive agencies. Major rules of administrative law, such 
as National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services45 deference, thus feature prominently in many 
immigration decisions.46 Professor Alina Das has observed that federal 
authorities now often invoke Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.47 deference to shield their decisions from judicial 
scrutiny, where in the past they might have been able to rely on plenary 
power.48  
On the surface, application of Chevron deference often seems 
completely appropriate in immigration cases.49 Administrative law’s 
deference doctrines work best when there is an ambiguous statute 
                                                                                                                 
 41. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 42. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 44. See Jill E. Family, DAPA and the Future of Immigration Law as Administrative Law, 
55 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 89 (2015).  
 45. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).  
 46. See, e.g., Matter of Fajarado Espinoza, 26 I&N Dec 603, 605 (BIA 2015); Matter of 
Alfonso Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79, 81 (BIA 2013); Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46, 49 
(BIA 2012). 
 47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 48. See Alina Das, Unshacking Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory 
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 163–64 (2015). 
 49. See id. at 148. 
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offering more than one reasonable policy choice, in which case it makes 
sense to defer to a branch of government that has more technical policy 
expertise and more accountability to the public.50 Chevron deference 
also is a means by which the courts try to enforce congressional intent 
to allow agencies to have discretion about how to apply ambiguous 
statutes.51 
But it is not clear that these rationales are strong enough to defend 
judicial deference in certain kinds of immigration cases. Professor Das 
has highlighted the problem that application of Chevron in immigration 
detention cases produces disturbing results because it limits judicial 
review in cases involving physical liberty and “operates as a 
presumption in favor of detention.”52 Recently I participated in an 
intriguing debate about why the Court has not cited Chevron in several 
recent cases interpreting ambiguous criminal grounds of removal.53 This 
apparent inconsistency can feed a continuing sense that immigration is 
just different, though it doesn’t tend to produce a sense of coherency—
in large part because the Supreme Court has yet to explain why it 
invokes Chevron in some cases, but not in others. It may be that some 
justices are uneasy with deferring to the political branches when 
physical liberty is at stake, but they are unsure how to explain this, since 
there are other immigration cases where such deference would not be so 
problematic.  
Disaggregation can be helpful to bring some order to this apparent 
muddle. It teaches us to not assume that all cases involving non-citizens 
must be resolved using common legal doctrines. Instead, we should 
look at the specific concerns raises by different contexts. Cases that 
involve putting people in custody or deporting them raise constitutional 
concerns that make deference less appropriate than in other immigration 
cases that do not involve a deprivation of physical liberty.  
In Padilla v. Kentucky,54 the Supreme Court said that deportation is 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See id. at 865–66 (identifying policy expertise and accountability to voters as 
justifications for judicial deference). 
 51. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). 
 52. Das, supra note 48, at 149. 
 53. Compare Michael Kagan, Does Chevron Have an Immigration Exception?, YALE J. 
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-chevron-have-an-
immigration-exception-by-michael-kagan/, and Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration 
Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael-kagan/, with 
Patrick Glen, Response to Kagan on Torres v. Lynch and Immigration Exceptionalism, YALE J. 
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 27, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/response-to-kagan-on-
torres-v-lynch-and-immigration-exceptionalism-by-patrick-glen/, and Asher Steinberg,  Torres 
v. Lynch—A Sub Silento Holding on Chevron Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Criminal Law?, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (June 1, 2016), 
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/torres-v-lynch-sub-silentio-holding-on.html. 
 54. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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analogous to imprisonment in criminal cases.55 By this logic, it makes 
sense that Chevron might have less relevance in cases that involve 
grounds of removal or detention of immigrants before they are deported. 
Such measures are more analogous to criminal punishment and pre-trial 
detention in criminal procedure.56 We do not defer to prosecutors to 
interpret criminal statutes the way we defer to the Environmental 
Protection Agency to interpret the Clean Water Act.57 Instead, in these 
cases criminal procedure might be a better analogy than administrative 
law. However, there will be other immigration cases where the 
administrative law approach fits much better. This will typically be the 
case when there is a much weaker claim that any constitutional liberty is 
being infringed. The application of deference in Scialabba v. Cuellar de 
Osorio58 might be such a case, since it involved criteria for family 
sponsorship visas but did not involve a loss of physical liberty.59 
Likewise, some immigration cases may raise foreign affairs and 
national security concerns more directly than others. Kerry v. Din 
appears to be such an example.60 
Disaggregation can be liberating. If we think of “immigration law” 
as merely a collection of disaggregated legal systems, then the justices 
need not develop a new, unifying theory for all cases involving non-
citizens. They need only decide the case in front of them, worrying only 
about other cases touching on similar subject matter. Likewise, 
immigration law scholars need not worry about proposing a unifying 
replacement theory for plenary power. However, there is a catch. The 
constant struggle in our system of judicial precedent is to distinguish 
cases that are related from those that are not. The temptation will always 
be to distinguish doctrines that are inconvenient and to rely on those that 
are helpful to achieve a particular objective. Advocates writing briefs 
have little choice but to do this. But the task for judges and scholars is to 
find coherent ways to actually do the disaggregation. Otherwise, we will 
replace one form of incoherency with another. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See id. at 361–64.  
 56. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that pre-trial detention 
in criminal cases does not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 57. Compare Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009) (applying 
Chevron deference to EPA interpretation of the Clean Water Act), with United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny standard to statute permitting pre-trial 
detention in criminal cases).  
 58. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 59. See id. at 2196–97. 
 60. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132–33 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing 
a request for a spousal visa from deprivation of life, liberty or property as understood in the 
Magna Carta). 
